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ERRATA TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1. The cover erroneously identifies the Appellant's Brief as 
the "Brief of Appellee." 
2. In the Table of Contents, under the heading "Summary of 
Arguments, sub heading, "I", line 5 should readf ". . .undisputed 
PIP benefits from Archuleta's own. . ." 
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"[R. at 695 and 969] ." 
6. Page 6, line 3 of Paragraph 4, "[R. at 1178]" should read 
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13. Page 8, line 2 of Paragraph 15, "[R. at 523-34, 690]" 
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Plaintiff and Appellant Maxine Archuleta ("Archuleta") 
hereby submits, pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, her opening brief with respect to the 
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
entered on January 23, 1996, the Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel Discovery entered on December 5, 1995, and 
the Judgment of Non-Suit entered on January 24, 1996 by the 
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County. 
JURISDICTION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS 
This is an appeal of right taken from a Judgment of Non-
Suit and final orders denying Archuleta's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Compel. No post-judgment 
motions were filed by either party. The final Judgment 
appealed from was entered on January 24, 1996. Archuleta 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 21, 1996. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) has been "poured 
over" to the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
Archuleta's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because 
Defendant and Appellee Donald C. Hughes ("Hughes") was not 
entitled to collect legal fees for services not covered by his 
written fee agreement where the fee agreement did not provide 
for the settlement of medical bills or collecting undisputed 
PIP benefits? 
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(a) Standard of review; The trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & 
Casualty co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed by Archuleta, [R. at 738]; Order on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. at 690]. 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
Archuleta's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because Hughes 
was precluded by applicable ethical rules from charging 
Archuleta a contingent fee for the routine collection of PIP 
insurance benefits from her own insurer? 
(a) Standard of review: Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty co. 
v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed by Archuleta, [R. at 738]; Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Brief Re: Construction of Attorney Fee Agreement, 
[R. at 477]; Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment [R. at 690]. 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
Archuleta's Motion to Compel Discovery with regard to bank 
account information relating to Hughes' handling of certain 
2 
funds belonging to Archuleta, which information had a bearing 
on Archuleta's fraud and malpractice claims? 
(a) Standard of review; Decisions regarding pre-trial 
discovery are committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, e.g., Utah Dept. of Transportation v, Oscruthorpe, 892 
P.2d 4,6 (Utah 1995); Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 515 
(Utah App. 1996). The wrongful denial of requested discovery, 
however, is presumed to be prejudicial rather than harmless, 
because the aggrieved party has been denied access to the 
requested information and cannot be required to proved that 
the information that has been denied would have affected the 
outcome of the trial. Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: Motion to Compel 
Discovery [R. at 272]; Order on Several Motions (Denying 
Motion to Compel) at f 8 [R. at 523-24]. 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to give 
Archuleta's proffered jury instruction holding Hughes 
responsible for the acts of his agent who dealt with Archuleta 
on Hughes7 behalf? 
(a) Standard of review: A trial court's refusal to give 
a requested jury instruction is an issue of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Onglnt'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal; [R. at 1052-60] 
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5. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
Archuleta's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because Hughes 
constructively defrauded Archuleta by charging her an illegal 
and unreasonable contingent fee for collecting undisputed PIP 
benefits. 
(a) Standard of review: Higctins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty co. 
v. Gearv, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal; Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed by Archuleta, [R. at 738]; Order on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [R. at 690] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a legal malpractice case arising out of the 
representation and handling of a personal injury claim by 
Hughes. In particular, the case involves the interpretation 
and application of an "Attorney Retainer Contract" that was 
entered into by Archuleta and Hughes' representative, Ronald 
Bennett. Hughes, acting almost entirely through his adjuster, 
Bennett, settled Archuleta's case and charged her a contingent 
fee of one-third of the total amount recovered — including 
$2400 in PIP benefits that were undisputed and which she would 
have been entitled to upon submission to her insurer. 
Archuleta's claims against Hughes arise out of his handling 
of her claim, including his retaining the contingent fee from 
the PIP benefits due from Archuleta's insurer. 
4 
Archuleta moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
grounds that the written fee agreement between Archuleta and 
Hughes did not provide for the collection of contingent fees 
for the collection of PIP benefits and because charging a 
contingent fee to collect such benefits is illegal. Archuleta 
further moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that 
Hughes' conduct constituted, as a matter of law, constructive 
fraud. Archuleta also moved to compel discovery of certain 
bank records relating to Hughes' handling of settlement funds 
belonging to Archuleta, as these records had a direct bearing 
on Archuleta's claims for malpractice and fraud. At the jury 
trial held on Archuleta's claims, Archuleta requested that the 
jury be instructed that Hughes could be held liable for the 
acts or omissions of his agent, Bennett. Archuleta appeals 
from the denial of these motions and the refusal to give the 
requested jury instruction as to Hughes' liability for the 
acts of his agent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Less than a week after her auto accident injury, 
Archuleta was contacted by Ronald Bennett, a non-lawyer who 
worked as a "public adjuster."1 Bennett offered to 
!In Utah State Bar v. Sumerhays & Hayden Public 
Adjusters, 905 P. 2d 867 (Utah, 1995) , the Utah Supreme Court 
held that representation of parties by public adjusters 
constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court upheld a permanent injunction against public 
adjusting. 
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"represent" her in seeking compensation from the responsible 
party. [R. at 961-65] 
2. When Archuleta met with Bennett in his office at the 
back of a store, she signed an Attorney Retainer Agreement 
which designated Donald Hughes, the defendant-appellee here, 
as her attorney. [R. at 967-68] 
3. Hughes, who resided in St. Louis at that time, 
admitted he was not present when the retainer was signed, that 
the blank contract spaces were probably completed by Bennett, 
and that he never personally met Archuleta, but claimed he 
recalled talking to her twice on the phone. [R. at 1176-78] 
4. Hughes never corresponded with his "client,'' 
Archuleta, [R. at 969] and indeed did not even retain her 
phone number in his legal file. [R. at 1178] Neither Hughes 
nor Bennett explained to Archuleta the difference between 
liability payments from the other parties' insurer and PIP 
benefits from her own insurer. [R. at 970] 
5. The "Attorney Retainer Agreement" signed by 
Archuleta was ambiguous regarding contingent compensation 
terms, and did not provide attorney fees for collecting 
undisputed insurance benefits due under Archuleta's own 
insurance policy from her insurer. (A copy of the Attorney 
Retainer Agreement is attached hereto as Attachment "A.") 
6. Hughes "handled" Archuleta's case entirely from St. 
Louis. He did not obtain medical information about her 
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condition. Instead, Hughes authorized Bennett to initiate and 
conduct settlement discussions (in which he did not 
participate) with the insurance company• [R. at 85-86] 
7. Bennett accepted the insurance company's first offer 
of $6,500.00 with the proviso that unpaid medical expenses of 
$2,400 be included in the settlement rather than being 
submitted for payment under the plaintiff's PIP policy and 
then reimbursed by the liability carrier. Archuleta was not 
told that the settlement included unpaid PIP benefits. [R. at 
53] 
8. Thus, the gross settlement payment of $9,186 
included $2,400 for the balance of medical bills which would 
have been reimbursable as personal injury protection (PIP) 
benefits under Archuleta's own insurance policy2 [R. at 1076], 
but had not been submitted to the insurer (at Bennett's 
direction). [R. at 981] 
9. Hughes has admitted that the $2400 of unpaid medical 
expenses would have been paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance if 
the bills had been submitted. [R. at 1063-64] 
10. Despite this, Hughes took a full one-third fee of 
$800 on the $2400 included in the settlement for the medical 
2Both the other driver and Archuleta were insured by the 
same insurance company, Allstate, and thus the total 
settlement received by Archuleta related to both proceeds from 
her "own" insurance policy as well as that of the other 
driver. 
7 
expenses that would have been paid under Archuleta's PIP 
coverage. [R. at 1075-76] 
11. In addition, Hughes retained $1186 from Archuleta's 
share of the settlement, ostensibly to pay pending hospital 
bills, even though his retainer agreement did not retain him 
to settle her bills. [R. at 1103] 
12. This $1,186 was returned to Archuleta after she 
dismissed plaintiff and retained another attorney. [R. at 
1105] Hughes never resolved the outstanding medical bills or 
contacted the hospital to do so. [R. at 1110] 
13. Archuleta moved for partial summary judgment on the 
grounds that as a matter of law Hughes was not entitled to 
collect a contingent fee on the $2400 portion of the 
settlement that would have been payable to her under her own 
PIP benefits. [R. at 738] 
14. Archuleta also moved to compel discovery responses 
relating to her discovery requests relating to Hughes' 
handling of the $1186 that he had held in his account for the 
payment of medical bills. [R. at 272] 
15. Both the summary judgment and the motion to compel 
discovery were denied. [R. at 523-34, 690] 
16. A jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of 
Hughes on Archuleta's claims that Hughes was guilty of legal 
malpractice. [R. at 688] 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
1. Hughes collected a one-third contingency fee for 
certain PIP insurance benefits obtained from Archuleta's own 
insurer rather than the tortfeasor who injured her. The 
written contingent fee agreement drafted by Hughes and signed 
by Archuleta must be construed strictly against Hughes. It 
does not allow Hughes to recover for settlement of medial 
bills or collection of undisputed PIP benefits. 
2. Because there is virtually no risk of non-recovery 
in collection of PIP insurance benefits, the Utah State Bar 
and other courts and bar associations have determined that it 
is unethical to charge "contingent" fees for the collection of 
routine PIP insurance benefits. Hughes' collection of fees on 
Archuleta's PIP benefits was therefore prohibited. 
3. Virtually all of the "work" done to settle 
Archuleta's case was performed by a "public adjuster," Ron 
Bennett, who was acting on behalf of Hughes. Utah agency law 
holds principals liable for the acts of their agents acting 
within the scope of their agency. It was therefore error for 
the trial court to refuse to give a jury instruction that 
Hughes was responsible for the acts and omissions of his agent 
— Bennett. This error was compounded by the Court's 
statement: "Mr. Bennett is not on trial here." [R. at 970] 
4. Archuleta sought discovery of bank records relating 
to Hughes' handling of certain settlement funds owed to her. 
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Hughes resisted this request on the fallacious grounds that 
these records were "privileged." Archuleta sought to compel 
production of this information, which motion was denied. The 
erroneous denial of discovery information is presumed to be 
prejudicial as the party requesting the information does not 
have the information to show whether it would have affected 
the outcome of the trial. 
5. Because of his status as her attorney, Hughes is, as 
a matter of law, in a confidential relationship with 
Archuleta. His abuse of that relationship by failing to 
disclose that his charging of contingent fees for collection 
of PIP benefits, which were excessive and ethically 
prohibited, constituted constructive fraud on Archuleta. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in denying Archuleta's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment as Hughes' retainer 
agreement was ambiguous and did not retain him to 
settle medical bills or collect undisputed PIP 
benefits Archuleta's own insurer. 
The written "Attorney Retainer Agreement" pursuant to 
which Hughes was hired by Archuleta to represent her is a 
single-page, pre-printed "form" document with blanks that have 
been "filled-in" in handwriting. The document is less than 
one full page in length and is set forth in its entirety as 
Attachment ttA." In describing the work to be completed by 
Hughes and the compensation for doing this work, the Agreement 
provides: 
10 
In consideration of the legal services to be 
rendered by Attorney Donald C. Hughes, hereinafter 
referred to as Attorney, for any claim that Maxine 
Archuleta, hereinafter referred to as Client, may 
have against the party or parties responsible for 
injuries and damages sustained by Client on or 
about the 15 [sic] day of October 1993 arising from 
a certain occurrence in [illegible] County, State 
of Utah, briefly described as follows: auto 
collision. 
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to commence 
and prosecuted said claim and assigns to Attorney a 
lien of 1/3 (1/3%) [sic] of all amounts recovered 
by compromise, settlement or judgment obtained 
after trial or within 10 days of the date set for 
trial. It is understood by Client that this 
agreement extends only through preparation and 
trial of the claim, and not to the defense or 
prosecution of any appeal that may be required. 
IF NO RECOVERY IS OBTAINED, NO FEE SHALL BE PAYABLE 
TO ATTORNEY. 
Attachment "A" at 1. 
Under established case law in Utah, contingent fee 
agreements are to be "strictly construed against one who is 
'both the attorney draftsman of and a party to the 
instrument.'" Phillips v. Smith, 768 P. 2d 449, 451 (Utah 1989) 
quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bvbee, 306 P.2d 773, 
775 (Utah 1957) . In Phillips the Utah Supreme Court held that 
because a written contingent fee agreement was silent 
regarding the client's liability if representation was 
terminated prior to the obtaining recovery no fees were owed 
by the clients to attorneys who were discharged before 
settlement. "[T]he express agreement of the parties did not 
provide for the possibility that [attorneys'] representation 
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of the [clients] would be terminated before the [clients'] 
claim was settled. Therefore the [clients] owed the 
[attorneys] nothing when they terminated that representation." 
Phillips, 768 P.2d at 452. 
The written Attorney Retainer Agreement prepared by 
Hughes and executed by Archuleta is hopelessly ambiguous. 
Read literally, it provides for payment to Hughes of a 
percentage of settlement amounts "obtained after trial or 
within 10 days of the date set for trial." Because there was 
no date set for trial and no trial of Archuleta's claims, 
under the rationale of Phillips no compensation was due to 
Hughes. Moreover, the written agreement is ambiguous as to 
the amount of compensation owing. The agreement calls for a 
"lien" of "1/3 (1/3%) of all amounts recovered." If this were 
strictly construed against Hughes, he would be entitled to 
.0033 of the amount recovered for Archuleta. 
Even if it is possible to "gloss over" the problems 
inherent in the drafting of the Agreement, it simply does not 
provide for any fees to Hughes for settling Archuleta's 
medical bills or her claims against her own insurance company. 
Under long-established ethical rules, contingent fee 
agreements in Utah are required to be in writing. See Rule 
1.5(c) Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The Retainer 
Agreement signed by Archuleta allows Hughes to pursue claims 
Archuleta "may have against the party or parties responsible 
12 
for injuries and damages sustained by Archuleta . . . ." No 
mention is made of pursuing claims against her insurer. No 
mention is made of retaining Hughes to settle her medical 
bills. In the absence of a clear written statement that 
Hughes was to pursue such claims, there was no basis for him 
to collect contingent fees from Archuleta on the basis of 
settling her PIP claims against her own insurer. 
The Utah State Bar's fee arbitration panel has ruled that 
a retainer agreement similar to the one used by Hughes in this 
case was improper and limited the attorney to recovering the 
reasonable value of his services. See Utah Bar Journal. 
January 1994, p. 23 (Copy attached hereto as Attachment "B") 
In that case, the tortfeasor had been uninsured, so an 
attorney filed a personal injury claim against his client's 
own insurance company, collecting $100,000 under the policy's 
uninsured motorist provisions, retaining one-third of this 
recovery as his fee. While the client's right to recovery 
stemmed from the same accident and injuries for which she had 
initially retained her attorney, the fee was found to be 
improper because the representation contract did not provide 
a fee for recovering from the client's own insurance company. 
The attorney was admonished for charging an excessive fee and 
restricted to recovering only the reasonable value of services 
he had rendered. 
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The representation agreement in this case must similarly 
be construed strictly against Hughes, who provided the form to 
his client. It imply does not provide a fee for settling 
medical bills or collecting benefits under Archuleta7s own 
contract of insurance. Because Hughes would not be allowed an 
$800 fee for recovering $2,400 in PIP benefits if he had 
directly submitted the medical expenses to Archuleta's own PIP 
carrier, he cannot be allowed to claim that fee by including 
this $2,400 into the liability settlement. 
Archuleta moved for partial summary judgment against 
Hughes on the issue of his fees with respect to her PIP 
benefits. Summary judgment should be granted when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Gillman v. Dept. of 
Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989). The 
undisputed material facts establish that even though Hughes' 
retainer agreement did not allow attorney fees for settling 
PIP claims with Archuleta's own insurer, he charged Archuleta 
a one-third contingency fee of $8 00 on insurance settlement 
funds for medical bills that her insurer would have paid to 
Archuleta as PIP benefits if they had been submitted. On 
these facts, Archuleta was entitled to partial summary 
judgment as to $800 of the fee charged by Hughes as a matter 
of law. This Court should reverse the trial court's refusal 
to grant summary judgment on this issue. 
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II. The trial court erred in not granting Archuleta's 
Motion for Partial Summary judgment as Utah ethical 
rules prohibit charging contingent fees for the 
routine collection of PIP insurance benefits. 
It is undisputed that Hughes received $800 of contingent 
fees from the settlement funds paid to Archuleta that 
represented one-third of the $2400 PIP insurance benefits she 
was to receive from her own insurer, Allstate. Charging 
contingent fees for the collection of PIP insurance benefits 
is unethical and prohibited in Utah. Opinion 114 of the Utah 
State Bar's Ethic's Advisory Opinion Committee, which was 
issued on February 20, 1992, flatly prohibits the use of a 
one-third contingency fee for collection of PIP benefits from 
a client's insurer. The full opinion of the Committee is as 
follows: 
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which require that a lawyer's fee be reasonable, 
contingent fees charged for the routine filing and 
collection of undisputed PIP or "no fault" claims 
from the client's insurer are unreasonable and 
excessive. State bars, courts, and commentators 
facing this issue uniformly agree that contingent 
fees charged on the recovery of undisputed PIP 
payments are unreasonable. Contingent fees are 
generally higher [than fixed fees] because receipt 
of the fee itself is contingent on some 
possibility. Because PIP benefits are virtually 
guaranteed to accident victims a fee continent on 
the receipt of those benefits is likely to be 
unreasonable. 
(emphasis added) Accordingly, the Utah Bar advised Utah 
attorneys that Rule 1.5(a)3 would be violated by charging a 
3Which requires that lawyer's fees be reasonable. 
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contingent fee for the filing and collection of PIP or 'no 
fault' claims from the client's insurer. 
The reasonableness of a contingent fee contract depends 
in part on the "realistic risk of non-recovery." Id. Since 
there is "virtually no risk" and minimal time involved for the 
lawyer, contingent fees are improper for the collection of PIP 
benefits. Id. This same conclusion has been reached in 
numerous other jurisdictions. See, e.gr,, Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985); Pops & Estrin, P.C. 
v. Reliance Insurance Co. , 562 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1990); In re Hannaf 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C. 1987); and Brickman, 
Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the 
Prince of Denmark? 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 76-78 (1989). 
Hughes defended his fee in this case by asserting that 
Archuleta was obligated to introduce expert testimony that he 
had violated the "standard of care" expected of an attorney in 
Weber County, Utah. This is incorrect. The prohibition 
against levying contingent fees for collecting undisputed PIP 
benefits has nothing to do with a "standard of care." Courts 
and bar associations have the inherent authority to regulate 
attorney fee agreements. Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,453 
(Utah 1989) ("The awarding and approving of attorney's fees is 
subject to the inherent power of a court to regulate the 
professional conduct of attorneys.") When a fee agreement is 
prohibited by such regulation, the offending provision is 
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unenforceable as a matter of law. Allowing Hughes to retain 
the $800 fee for settling Archuleta's PIP claims would defeat 
the established policy of the Utah State Bar and established 
precedent relating to the interpretation and enforcement of 
contingent fee contracts. As enforced by Hughes, his 
Agreement on this point was illegal and void. The trial 
court's denial of Archuleta's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
this point should be reversed. 
III. The trial court erred in refusing Archuleta's 
proffered jury instruction on Hughes' responsi-
bility for the acts of his agent. 
It is undisputed that the actual handling of Archuleta's 
claim was accomplished— with some claimed contact and 
direction by Hughes from St. Louis — by Ronald Bennett, 
acting in the capacity of "public adjuster." It was Bennett 
who solicited Archuleta as a client. It was Bennett who 
"filled out" the "form" Retainer Agreement with Archuleta. It 
was Bennett who did not investigate the claim. It was Bennett 
who contacted the insurance company and negotiated the 
settlement agreement. In all of these actions, Bennett was 
acting on behalf of his principal, Hughes. Bennett is not an 
attorney. He has no authority to practice law or to prosecute 
claims on behalf of another in court. Only as an agent for 
Hughes were Bennett's acts permissible. As Bennett's 
principal, Hughes is inescapably responsible for Bennett's 
failure to thoroughly investigate Archuleta's case and his 
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negotiation of an inappropriate and illegal settlement 
agreement. 
At trial, Hughes attempted to distance himself from 
Bennett's actions, Indeed, the theme of his defense was: "I 
am not Bennett." This technique was, in one sense, effective. 
Indeed, even the trial judge at one point stated that "Bennett 
is not on trial here." While Bennett was not on trial, he had 
acted as Hughes' agent throughout his handling of Archuleta's 
claim and his actions on behalf of Hughes were on trial 
because they were attributable — as a matter of law — to his 
principal, Hughes. "It is well established in the law that a 
principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope 
of the agent's authority, irrespective of whether the 
principal is disclosed or undisclosed." Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992); see also Phillips 
v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1983). 
Notwithstanding the undisputed facts demonstrating 
Bennett's relationship with Hughes, as outlined above, the 
trial court refused to give a MUJI jury instruction on the 
"liability of a principal for the acts of agents." This 
prejudice of this error was compounded by Hughes' repeated 
statements in his defense that "he was not Bennett" and 
implicitly that he should not be identified with or held 
responsible for Bennett's acts. 
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A trial court's refusal to issue a proffered jury 
instruction presents a question of law for which no deference 
is granted to the trial court's conclusion. Ona International 
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). The 
erroneous omission of a jury instruction requires a new trial 
if the error was prejudicial. Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 
1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (failure to instruct that minor 
engaged in adult activity held to same standard of care as 
adult was prejudicial error, even though another instruction 
defined general standard of care, where opposing counsel and 
expert repeatedly referred to mitigating effect of defendant's 
youth and inexperience). Because Hughes' statements in his 
defense put the relationship and responsibility of Hughes for 
Bennett's acts squarely at issue, the refusal to give the jury 
instruction on vicarious liability of principals was 
prejudicial error requiring reversal and a new trial. 
IV. The trial court erred when it refused to compel 
Hughes' production of certain credit union account 
records which could have produced evidence of both 
fraud and malpractice. 
Archuleta sought through written discovery and 
subsequently through a Motion to Compel Discovery information 
regarding the $1,186 that was withheld from the proceeds of 
her settlement for a period of several months. Specifically, 
Archuleta requested that Hughes produce: 
[C]opies of all statements from that account [i.e. 
Hughes' Trust Account] for all times that any money 
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was held for plaintiff7s benefit (i.e. from the 
date of settlement to the time the final $1,185 was 
paid to the plaintiff.) 
Defendant7s Response to Plaintiff7s Third Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Request for 
Production of Documents, (copy attached as Attachment "C"). 
Hughes7 Response to this Request was as follows: 
Defendant objects to this request. This request is 
unduly burdensome, harassing and not calculated to 
lead to the admission of admissible evidence. The 
information sought is privileged. 
Id. Archuleta moved to compel production of the trust account 
information. The trial court denied Archuleta7s motion to 
compel. 
Archuleta was certainly entitled to obtain through 
discovery copies of the bank statements for the account in 
which her money had been held. The account was at a credit 
union and appears to be a interest bearing account. It is 
unethical for Hughes to earn interest on money held in trust 
for Archuleta. He must account to her for interest earned and 
pay it over to her.4 Moreover, Archuleta is entitled to 
verify that the money was in the trust account during the 
4Rule 1.15(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
requires that : 
[A] lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or 
third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and 
upon request by the client or third person, shall 
promptly render a full accounting regarding such 
property. (emphasis added). 
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period of time it was held by the Hughes. There was some 
evidence that Hughes7 spouse, a non-attorney, may have been a 
signatory on the account in which Archuleta's funds were held. 
This too would have been a violation of Hughes' ethical duties 
to Archuleta. Hughes opposed production of records for the 
account on the grounds that the bank statements contained 
privileged information concerning his clients. Such an 
assertion is untenable on its face. Bank records simply to 
not contain or reflect client names or other identifying 
information. 
In Askew v. Hardman. 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
the Utah Court of Appeals set forth the principal that the 
erroneous denial of a discovery request is presumed to be 
prejudicial error and that the burden of justifying the denial 
of discovery is on the party resisting discovery: 
However, the usual harmless-error analysis is 
inapposite where the trial court has erroneously 
denied a discovery request. In such situations, 
this court is required to presume prejudice unless 
it is shown that the denial was harmless. Weahkee 
v. Norton. 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980); 
accord Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 550 
(10th Cir. 1984). Prejudice is presumed because to 
require the requesting party to show that the error 
was harmful would place the requesting party in the 
untenable position of having to demonstrate that 
the contents of inaccessible information would have 
affected the outcome of the case. Because the 
requesting party does not have the information, he 
or she will never be able to demonstrate that the 
trial court's erroneous denial of a discovery 
request was anything but harmless. The burden of 
demonstrating that the erroneous denial of a 
discovery reguest was not prejudicial must 
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therefore rest with the party resisting discovery. 
See In re California Public Utilities Comm'n, 892 
F.2d 778, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1989). Where we cannot 
determine from the record whether the reguested 
documents might have changed the outcome of the 
trial, we cannot say that the error was harmless. 
Weahkee, 621 F.2d at 1083; Shaklee Corp., 748 F.2d 
at 550. Because defendant has not demonstrated 
that the denial of plaintiff's discovery request 
was not prejudicial, and because we cannot 
determine from the record whether the requested 
documents would have changed the outcome of the 
case, the trial court committed prejudicial error 
in denying plaintiff's discovery request. 
884 P.2d at 1262-63 (emphasis added). 
Under the rationale of Askew, the trial court's denial of 
discovery in the present case must be presumed to be 
prejudicial. Unless this Court can "determine from the record 
whether the requested documents might have changed the outcome 
of the trial" the error cannot be held to be harmless. There 
is simply no way to determine from the record whether the 
requested information might have changed the outcome of the 
trial. For this reason, in addition to the foregoing matters, 
Archuleta is entitled to a reversal and new trial. 
V, As a matter of law, Hughes constructively defrauded 
Archuleta when he charged her an Illegal and un-
reasonable contingent fee for collecting undisputed 
PIP benefits. 
Under well-established precedent in Utah, an attorney-
client relationship is a fiduciary and confidential 
relationship. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449, 451 
(Utah 1989); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 
1985); Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1978). 
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This confidential relationship exists as matter of law. 
Because he was her attorney, Hughes had a confidential 
relationship with Archuleta. 
It is also well-established that this type of 
confidential relationship can give rise to a claim for 
constructive fraud where the dominant party (i.e. the 
attorney) breaches a duty owed to the other party, even though 
no intent to defraud existed. As stated in Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 
If the circumstances are such that the [ a 
party ] could exercise extraordinary influence over 
the [other ] and the defendant was or should have 
been aware the plaintiff reposed trust and 
confidence in the defendant and reasonably relied 
on defendants guidance, then the parties are said 
to be in "confidential relationship" and the 
plaintiff's burden is considerably diminished. A 
course of dealing between persons so situated is 
watched with extreme jealousy and solicitude, and 
if there is found the slightest trace of undue 
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be 
given to the injured party. 
. . . . There are a few relationships (such as 
parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) 
which the law presumes to be confidential. 
590 P.2d at 302 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985), it was 
held that if: (1) a transaction between parties to a 
confidential relationship (2) benefits the dominant party in 
whom trust was reposed and (3) causes actual damage to the 
other party, then the dominant party has the burden of proving 
the transaction was in fact fair and not unduly influenced or 
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fraudulent; otherwise, the transaction will be set aside. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held found constructive 
fraud based on the attorney-client relationship where an 
attorney collected an excessive fee and then failed to 
renegotiate that fee when it was discovered that his client's 
right to the money was not being challenged. E.g.f In re 
Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051 (111. 1989). 
As Archuleta's attorney, Hughes was in a confidential 
relationship with her. He entered into a fee contract with 
her which he used to collect a contingency fee forbidden by 
ethical rules, breaching his duty to disclose there was little 
or no risk involved in collecting her PIP benefits. This 
transaction benefitted him financially, and damaged Archuleta 
in the amount of $800. These facts establish constructive 
fraud, and summary judgment should have been entered for 
Archuleta as a matter of law because Hughes failed to meet his 
burden of showing that the $800 contingent fee was in fact 
fair and not the result of fraud or undue influence. See Von 
Hake, 705 P. 2d at 769. As with the other matters discussed 
herein this error was prejudicial and warrants the reversal of 
the judgment entered in favor of Hughes. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing cases and authorities, 
Appellant Maxine Archuleta respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse and, as appropriate, remand this matter for 
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further proceedings consistent with the established Utah 
precedent upon which she relies. 
Dated this 1 ^  day of July, 1996. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
By: < ^ ^ f o ^ 
Mark E. Wilkey 
Attorneys for Appellant— 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
On the V\ day of July, 1996, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was served via United States mail, first 
class postage prepaid on the following: 
Donald C. Hughes, Esq. 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O. Box 27611 
St. Louis, MO 63146 
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ATTACHMENT "A 
Attorney Retainer Agreement 
ATTORNEY RETAINER AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the legal services to be rendered by Attorney 
Donald C. Hughes, hereinafter referred lo as Attorney, for any claims that 
hereinafter rcfencd to as Client, may have agaiust Ihc 
parly or parties responsible for injuries and damages sustained by Client ou or 
about the f *"i day of (*(' * . 19 fe> arising from a certain occurrence in 
.!_ /*L \f. County, Stale of ('.- 7£/ . briefly described as follows: 
!
 t " -'V -'**-- (W(**") ct • • 
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to commence and prosecute said 
claim and assigns to Attorney a lien of V^ , ( x/', %) of all amounts 
recovered by compromise, settlement or judgment obtained after trial or within 
10 days of the date set for trial. It is understood by Client that this agreement 
extends only through preparation and trial of the claim, and not to the defense 
or prosecution of any appeal thai may be required. 
IF NO RECOVERY IS OBTAINED, NO FEE SHALL BE 
PAYABLE TO ATTORNEY. 
The parlies to this agreement further agree as follows: 
All expenses of investigation, preparation, and suil including doctors 
reports, reports of olhcr experts, witness fees, filing fees and other court costs 
shall be paid as follows: k I / . I l l 
/\di'iu\t'c( ly -•-rrir./rva 
Any costs or expenses advances by Attorney shall be reimbursed in full 
from Clients share of any recovery. 
Allorncy retains the right lo employ associate counsel of his choice and 
at his expense. Allorncy further retains the right to withdraw from the case for 
any reason and at any tunc upon proper notice lo Client. 
Client agrees not lo drop the action or withdraw in the absence of 
Attorney's express written recommendation lo do so. Client further agrees nol 
to negotiate, discuss, or acccpl any settlement of this mailer from any 
individual, corporation, Finn or other entity uuless presented to Client by 
Attorney. 
Client agrees lo keep Altoruey advised of his whereabouts al all tunes 
and to coo|x:ralc in the preparation and Irial of Ihc case, to appear upon 
reasonable nolice for depositions and court appearances, and lo comply with all 
reasonable requests made of him by Allorncy in connection with the preparation 
and prosecution of this case. 
If Attorney is discharged before conclusion of the case, client agrees 
to pay an allorncy fee of S90.00 per hour for time spent on this case, plus cosls 
incurred. 
Client hereby authorizes Allorncy lo release any and all hospilal 
records, to the parties responsible for client's injuries, or their attorneys and 
insurance companies when deemed necessary by Attorney to obtain a recovery. 
Attorney agrees to prosecute client's claim with reasonable diligence 
and vigor. 
Client grants Attorney a lien on his claim for Attorney's fees and cosls 
and authorizes Attorney to retain his fee and cosls from any amount recovered 
by compromise, judgement or otherwise. 
Client acknowledges that any claim such as the one involved in this 
case is by its nature unpredictable and that Attorney has made no representation 
as to what amount, if any, client may be entitled lo recover. 
Clienl 
NOTE: THIS IS A CONTRACT. It prelects both you and your attorney 
and will prevent misunderstandings. Read it carefully. Tlcasc discussed or if 
you have any qucslious. 
ATTACHMENT "B 
See Utah Bar Journal 
January 1994, p. 23 
Discipline Corner 
ADMONITION 
An attorney was Admonished for 
.-narging an excessive fee in violation of 
Rule 1.5(a), FEES of the Rules of Profes-
sional . Conduct based upon a 
recommendation by a Screening Panel of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The 
attorney was retained to represent a client 
in a personal injury matter involving the 
client's son who was struck by an automo-
bile. When it was discovered that the 
motorist was uninsured the attorney filed a 
claim against the client's own insurance 
company and collected policy limits of 
S 100.000.00 under the uninsured motorist 
portion of the policy. The attorney kept 
one-third as a fee. A fee arbitration panel 
found this was an improper fee in that the 
contingency fee agreement between the 
attorney and the client did not include 
recovery from the client's own insurance 
company. Therefore,-the attorney was 
entitled only to the reasonable value of the 
services rendered. 
Utah State Bar Journal 
January 1994, page 23 
ATTACHMENT "C" 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Third Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 
Request for Production of Documents 
^ j r V - ; ^ 
Donald Hughes 
8816 Manchester Road, #242 
St. Louis, MO 63144 
Telephone: (314)968-8055 
Attorney for Pro Se 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH 
MAXINE ARCHULETA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD HUGHES, 
Defendant 
DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR 
ADMISSIONS AND REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Judge: Dawson 
No. 940700264 
Comes now the Defendant and answers the discovery request of the Plaintiff as 
follows: 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORIES 
1. Identify defendant's current employment including the names, address and 
phone numbers of all companies, partnerships, firms, entities or other organizations for 
which the defendant has done any work at any time during the last 12 months. 
Answer: Defendant objects to this interrogatory. This interrogatory is unduly 
burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The 
information is privileged and not relevant nor material to the present case. 
Pagel 
Response: This request is beyond the scope of discovery and is unduly 
burdensome, harassing and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence 
and therefore the same is denied. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OP DOCUMENTS 
11. Provide complete copies of defendant's tax returns for tax years 1992, 1993 
and 1994 including all schedules and attachments. 
Response: Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly 
burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The 
information is privileged and not relevant nor material to the present case. 
12. Provide a summary financial statement to verify the answer to interrogatory 
number six. 
Response: Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly 
burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The 
information is privileged and not relevant nor material to the present case. 
13. Produce a copy of the $5,000.00 check paid to the plaintiff from defendant's trust 
account. 
Response: Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly 
burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The request 
is onerous and burdensome and duplicative. 
14. Produce copies of all statements from that account for all times that any money 
was held for plaintiffs benefit (i.e. from the date of settlement to the time the final 
$1,185.00 was paid to the plaintiff). 
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Response: Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly 
burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The request 
is onerous and burdensome and duplicative. The information sought is privileged. 
Dated this ^ ' Day of July, 1995. 
Subscribed and sworn this J2JZ day of Ju,y.1 " 5 -
Notary Public pfc 
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